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“Killers” and “Friendlies”: Names Can Hurt Me 
Alec McHoul, Murdoch University 
 
Abstract 
This paper concerns an incident in 2003 when two American fighter pilots 
mistakenly fired on a ‘friendly’ British convoy and on the reportage of that 
incident in the British press some four years later. It starts with a focus on 
the designation of the airmen as ‘killer pilots’ (by The Sun newspaper 
which broke the story), using some concepts from membership 
categorisation analysis as developed by Harvey Sacks. It is contended that 
such an approach can afford insights into the nature of quite specific social 
identites. Hence the paper goes on (via the transcript of the air-to-ground 
tape) to contrast how the press ascribes identities to the pilots with how 
they avow identities for themselves. This contrast, I argue, gives us some 
insights into the moral culpability or otherwise of the ‘killer pilots’. 
 
1. The situation 
In March 2003 in Iraq, an American A-10 Thunderbolt fighter plane fired into a 
convoy of trucks and armoured vehicles belonging to the British Household 
Cavalry. It was, if anything could be, a classic case of “friendly fire” or, as the 
current military euphemism has it, a “blue-on-blue situation”. The result was not 
only damage to allied transport, but also the death of Lance Corporal Matty Hull. 
This was common knowledge for some time. But it was not until almost four 
years later, when The Sun newspaper published the air-to-ground tapes, that the 
moment-to-moment details became available to a larger (British and international) 
public. What motivates this analysis has to do with both the newspaper report, as 
such, and also the events reproduced in the transcript. 
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2. The report 
Let’s turn to the first of these, the news item and its intro. The Sun’s defence 
editor, Tom Newton Dunn, under the banner “The tape they wanted to hide”, 
gives us the details of the relevant call signs, the planes in the vicinity, the timing 
(hours, minutes and seconds) of the exchanges, and so forth. But there is one 
particular feature of this report that interests me, at least for now. So here is the 
prelim to the complete news report with the relevant part underlined:i 
The tape they wanted to hide 
By Tom Newton Dunn 
Defence Editor 
February 06, 2007 
 
This is the full transcript of the cockpit video from call sign POPOV36 during the 
disastrous friendly fire attack on the Household Cavalry patrol. 
Lasting just over 15 minutes, it begins just before the A-10 Thunderbolt pilot spots 
the four British vehicles. 
The local time is 4.36pm, or 1.36pm Greenwich Mean Time which is what the 
military use. 
The killer pilot’s wingman, hunting targets with him in a second A-10, had the 
call sign POPOV35. 
. . . 
The other main call signs on the radio net are MANILA HOTEL, MANILA34, and 
LIGHTNING34 — three US Marine Corps Forward Air Controllers on the ground 
attached to British units. 
Later on, other call signs come on the net to relay emergency ceasefire messages. 
They are SKY CHIEF, an American AWAC {{airborne warning and control}} jet 
controlling the overall air battle and COSTA58, a British pilot nearby. 
The time code in hours, minutes and seconds is from the digital clock on the 
pilot’s display. {{Transcript follows}} 
  < http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2-2007060131,00.html> 
Accessed 7 February 2007 
 
3. Membership categorisation and social identity 
What are we to make of this designation: “killer pilot”? One way of dealing with 
it would be to take a contrast case. One of my favourite magazine headlines — 
though I’m not sure where this comes from — is “Killer Nuns”. The nuns in Page 3 
question were learning karate: hence they were (potential) killers. But “killer” and 
“nuns” are rarely co-located. And this is how headlines routinely announce news: 
by deliberately mismatching membership categories (designations of types of 
persons) with their expectable actions (predicates) — hence the famous “man 
bites dog” (see Cuff & Payne, 1984: 188). 
  What I am rehearsing here is a perspective known as membership 
categorisation analysis (MCA) as pioneered by Harvey Sacks (1972a; 1972b; see 
also Silverman, 1998: 74-97, 128-152) and my argument will be that this can give 
us an insight into expressions like “killer pilot” in particular and, more 
importantly perhaps, a very useful analytic perspective for dealing with the 
broader question of social identities as such. But before running this through the 
category “killer pilot”, we need to explicate the basic vocabulary of MCA or, if 
you like, its terms and conditions. 
  Sacks’s innovation was to note that when we refer to members in the 
society we do so via clusters of possible terms.ii This is not “stereotyping” or 
anything of the sort. It is a logical consequence of the sheer fact that any given 
member can be referred to in an indefinite number of ways. The “pilot” in 
question here (noting that this is our first way of designating his membership) 
might also be “the boy next door”, “a Californian”, “a boxing champion”, “a 
heavy smoker” and so on through a long list of possible membership 
designations. How we solve this problem of sheer multiplicity in a practical way 
is, as noted, to cluster such membership designations into what Sacks calls 
membership categorisation devices (MCDs). These are things like FAMILY, Page 4 
OCCUPATION, NATIONALITY and so forth; noting here that I will use capitals 
for MCD names and quotation marks for the categories relevant to those devices. 
Hence we get sets of devices and categories like the following (see Table 1): 
  Table 1: Devices and their categories 
Devices    Categories 
FAMILY:    “mother”, “father”, “brother”, etc. 
OCCUPATION:    “postman”, “butcher”, “professor”, etc. 
NATIONALITY:  “Australian”, “Albanian”, “Afghan”, etc. 
 
  So, when we’re referring to a person via a particular category, it will 
always be by using a particular category from a particular device. And this is 
important for, as Sacks shows (1972b), some categories (membership terms) can 
belong to more than a single device. In his example, the designation “baby” can 
belong to the device FAMILY or else to that of STAGE OF LIFE; and the difference 
is crucial given that the “baby” of the FAMILY may be quite well advanced in 
years but still the youngest, while the “baby” from the STAGE OF LIFE device has 
to be a neonate.iii In ordinary talk and texts, we use such membership sets to 
make that talk and those texts consistent. If, in one turn at talk, I refer to someone 
as “a postman”, it’s not as consistent in the next turn for my interlocutor to add a 
reference to another as “a blonde” as it is for them to designate them as, say, “a 
police officer” or “a plumber”. Hence Sacks’s consistency rule: 
If some population of persons is being categorized and if some category from a 
device’s collection has been used to categorize a first Member of the population, 
then that category or other categories of the same collection may be used to 
categorize further members of the population (1972a: 33; original italics). 
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This, I believe, gives us enormous insight into how societies (a) cope with the 
problem of having available indefinitely many ways of referring to any given 
person and (b) form specifically social identities for persons within them. That is, 
the membership devices are collections, perhaps even collectivities, not of 
individuals but of types of person in the society. They are, in short, social identities. 
Hence an MCD analysis can, at least potentially, show us how social collections 
(not just any particular individuals) do actual, accountable, on the ground, here-
and-now, identity work. 
  What’s of further importance for the analysis of social identities is the moral 
(sometimes even judgmental) work that the selection of particular categories from 
particular devices can accomplish.iv Above, I referred to the predicates that 
category selections carry with them. These are sometimes also called “category-
bound activities”. Hence the expectable predicates for “nuns” would be praying, 
helping the needy and sick, abstaining, and so forth; noting that I will henceforth 
mark predicates with italics. Killing, then, is not on the list of expectables for this 
category of persons — which is not to say that it can’t get used for a deliberately 
disjunctive (or “newsy”) effect. 
  One of the more elegant aspects of this triplet (device + category + 
predicate) is that it frequently accomplishes its moral work by inference and 
implication, rather than by direct mention.v In fact, direct mention can be a signal 
of a certain kind of social incompetence. We don’t say (unless when perhaps 
writing a reading primer for kids) “Bill’s the postman, he comes to our house each 
day and leaves mail in the mailbox”. Bill’s being designated as the postman is Page 6 
sufficient for competent members to hear (infer) just what it is he expectably does. 
And this cuts both ways. So if I offer you a well-chosen predicate re some person 
I’m talking about, you can hear which category from which device I’m implying. 
In Wowk’s (1984) example, a man is being interrogated by police re a woman he 
has allegedly killed. He refers to her prior conduct in the bar where they met as, 
inter alia, “getting kind of pricky”. From the predicate, I take it that readers will 
not need to have it spelled out what category of person is being implied here and 
the moral work that that could be attempting in a police interrogation. 
 
4. Who goes there ... ? 
Given this brief outline of how membership categorisation works in a rather 
general way, can we now say anything along these lines about the particular 
category of “killer pilot” from our news article? A first thing we might like to 
notice here is that the category “pilot” is explicitly collocated with a predicate, 
killing via the adjectival use of “killer”. What kind of work could this be 
accomplishing in just this locale? I take it, from the plethora of available 
contextual cues (for example, that this is a “friendly fire attack”, that the pilot is 
flying an A-10 Thunderbolt, and so on), that the category “pilot”, in this case, is 
taken from the device MILITARY PERSONNEL (perhaps even COMBATANTS) 
and not, for example, from the broader device of PROFESSIONS or 
OCCUPATIONS; where these latter devices could include civilian and 
commercial pilots, hobbyists, naval helmsmen, and the like. So, more specifically, 
we can very easily hear “pilot” as glossing something more specific, like “fighter Page 7 
pilot”. Now surely that category from just this device already carries with it — by 
ordinary implication, for any competent member of the society — the predicate 
killing. Fighter pilots do, unless they are inept, expectably, routinely and 
accountably kill. This is one predicate we can, from a list of candidates, be 
extremely sure of. Fighter pilots may protect bomber fleets, strafe runways, escort 
convoys, and a whole range of similar military functions but, in and as part of 
these duties, their engagement in killing is beyond doubt. We might even say that 
they have the proverbial licence to kill, in the sense that, their engagement in that 
activity is, as for most categories from the device COMBATANTS, exempted from 
the usual social-moral sanctions against killing, if the killing is done within the 
“rules of war”. What then is the effect, in this particular news context, of Dunn’s 
explicit mention of killing (via “killer”)? 
  If pilots kill legitimately, my suspicion is that actually mentioning the 
killing is designed to reverse that legitimacy. That suspicion goes along the 
following lines: while, in a strictly literal sense, killing is a routine predicate for the 
category “(fighter) pilots”, the very legitimacy of their being ones who kill means 
that several alternative ways of formulating that predicate can, especially in intra-
military contexts, be brought into play. To be sure, fighter pilots, since the early 
days of WW1, have boasted of “kills” though this has rarely referred to the taking 
of human life but rather to the more anonymous matter of the number of enemy 
planes shot down in combat. Outside this restricted usage, various (could we 
say?) euphemisms are brought into play.vi Those belonging to the various 
categories from the device COMBATANTS should, on this account, explicitly not Page 8 
be “killers”. Rather they do their duty taking out enemy command posts, 
eliminating obstacles to the “progress of the war”, defending crucial personnel and 
matériel, advancing into enemy territory ... the alternatives to killing are legion 
while, at the same time, all concerned are fully aware that these activities 
themselves can, and frequently do, involve the taking of enemy lives. Taking an 
extreme case, in The Pentagon Papers, Noam Chomsky refers to a military report in 
which is was said that, during the Vietnam War, the villagers of My Lai “showed 
a 100% mortality response”, nicely shifting the focus away from what was done to 
the villagers and towards how they acted (Chomsky & Zinn, 1972).vii 
  So, if as we have seen, predicates commonly imply categories of persons 
(or social identities as types), what are the predicates the pilots and their ground 
controllers use to refer to their (the pilots’) actions and, hence, what are the social 
identities implied by those predicates? A number of formulations of possibly fatal 
activities are worked up in the transcript following the news report (above). For 
example, at the very start of the published transcript and video, the ground 
controller (Manila Hotel, MH) and one of the pilots (Popov35, P35) engage in the 
following exchange:viii 
Extract 1 
 
1336.30 MH:  Popov from Manila Hotel. Can you confirm you 
engaged that tube and those vehicles? 
1336.36 P35:  affirm sir.=and looks like I have multiple 
vehicles in (reve:ts) ah (*.*) ah:: (*.*) 
eight hundred metres to the no:rth of your 
arty rounds. c’n you ah switch fire, and ah 
(*.*) (shift/shoot) fire, try and get some 
arty rounds on those, 
1336.47 MH:  roger,=I >understand< that those are the 
impacts that ah you observed earlier on my 
timing? 
1336.51 P35:  affirmative. Page 9 
1336.52 MH:  >roger,< standby.=>let me make sure they’re 
not on another mission.< 
 
Referring to a strafing run on enemy vehicles just prior to the start of the tape, 
MH doesn’t mention anything that might connote hostilities, let alone killing.ix 
He asks P35 if he has “engaged” the convoy, an altogether more benign prospect. 
At the next turn (1336.36) during which P35 notices the British convoy (though he 
does not yet know that that’s just what it is), he doesn’t ask MH to kill the 
personnel on the ground, merely to train the artillery that he controls on their 
vehicles. Coming back then to the earlier run, MH again prefers a downgraded 
formulation: in this case “impacts”. And we can see parallels peppered 
throughout the video and its transcript. Some relevant examples: 
Extract 2 
 
1337.36 MH:  roger. that matches our intel up there. ah and 
under- understand you also have the other 
fixed wing up this push? ah::: (.) for 
terminal control, if you can. 
1337.44 P35:  I’d love to::. I didn’t talk to him yet. 
 
Extract 3 
 
1339.23 P35:  okay, copy. >like I said<, multiple (revetted) 
vehicles.=they look like flatbed tru:cks. ah 
(*.*) are those your targets? 
1339.30 MH:  that’s affirm. 
 
Extract 4 
 
1341.37 P36:  Popov Three Six ah:: is rolling in. 
1341.40 MH: tell you what. 
1341.41 P35:  I’m comin’ off west. you roll in. (*.*) it 
(*.*) it looks like they are: exactly what 
we’re talking about. 
1341.49 P36:  we got visual. 
1341.50 P36:  okay. I want to get that first one >before he 
gets into town then.< 
1341.53 P35:  yeah, go get ‘im. 
1341.55 P36:  awright, we got ah ro:cket launchers, it looks 
like. um number two is rolling in: (0.2) from Page 10 
the sou:th to the no:rth, (*.*) and ah two’s 
in. 
1342.04 P35:  get it. 
((P36, “rolls in” for an attack i.e. turns his 
A-10 aircraft into a vertical dive to fire on 
the vehicles)) 
1342.09  ((sound of gunfire)) 
1342.18 P35:  I’m off your west. 
1342.22 P35:  good hits. 
 
This last extract particularly interests me as it involves the first of the two runs on 
the British convoy, the major incident that this Sun report takes as its main news. 
Firstly the strike is formulated as “rolling in”; the aviational manoeuvre, as it 
were, standing proxy for the actual strafing and eventual “killing” of a British 
soldier on the ground. Popov36 then (1341.50) softens his intentions from 
anything like wanting to kill persons to wanting to “get” the first vehicle, a 
formulation immediately echoed by P36. Following this first run, again, there are 
no “kills”, only “hits” — and good ones. It may be important also to consider here 
the timing of the “runs” on the convoy: the first takes, from the tape timings, 
somewhere in the vicinity of 13 seconds; the second closer to seven seconds — 
such that the sheer speed of current technologies of combat effectively rules out 
intense ethical discussion about, say, the exact nature of the targets.x 
  So, if nothing else, we have to conclude that at least the pilots themselves 
continually formulated their actions as markedly distinct from anything like 
killing and, hence, themselves as anything but killers as such. What is ascribed to 
them by Dunn is quite the reverse of what they avow of themselves (cf. Coulter, 
1979 on the social consequences of the distinction between ascription and 
avowal). And they have, as it turns out, very good reason not to avow what Dunn 
ascribes; at least until after the second run on the convoy when the Popovs realise Page 11 
their mistake. That is, a pilot becomes ascribably a “killer pilot” when he fires on 
what all parties to the talk refer to as “friendlies”: allied troops and vehicles. And 
we should bear in mind that the tape itself became public only as a consequence 
of the 2007 inquest on the victim, Matty Hull, and so the determination of 
“killing” friendlies rather than “rolling in” on foe has potentially major 
consequences for the Popovs; as P35 confirms at 1348.12: “we’re in jail dude”.xi 
  There is, though backgrounded by many reports in the UK press, ample 
evidence that P35 and P36 had every good reason to believe that they were well 
clear of any allied forces. In fact, near the start of the tape, immediately following 
Extract 1 (where the convoy is first spotted), we get the following: 
Extract 5 
 
1336.52 MH:  >roger,< standby.=>let me make sure they’re 
not on another mission.< 
1336.57 P36:  hey, I got a four ship. looks like looks like 
we got orange panels on them though.=do we 
have any- any ah (.) friendlies up in this 
area? 
 
Orange panels are the official signal to allied forces that vehicles on the ground 
are friendly. They are a specific convention to that effect. And before the actual 
attack, P35 raises the question with the ground controller as to any possibility of 
“friendlies” being in the area only to have the possibility denied: 
Extract 6 
 
1337.16 P35:  confirm, north eight hundred metres. (0.2) 
confirm no friendlies this far north ah: on 
the ground. 
1337.21 MH:  That is ’n affirm.=you are well clear of 
friendlies. 
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Having received this definite call, the pilots still do not attack immediately. They 
go in for a closer look to see if they can find a reason as to why there might be 
orange markings on enemy trucks. P36, that is, is still not convinced that the 
panels do not mark “friendlies” but P35 assures him of ground control’s 
assessment: 
Extract 7 
 
1338.49 P36:  they look like they have orange panels on 
though. 
1338.51 P35:  he tol- (*.*) he told me there’s nobody north 
of here.=no friendlies. 
 
So, going in to investigate, this is what they (still cautiously) conclude: 
Extract 8 
 
1340.13 P36:  okay, well they got orange ro:ckets on them. 
1340.17 P35:  o:range ro:ckets? 
1340.17 P36:  yeah, I think so: 
1340.18 P35:  let me look. 
 
In the device COMBATANTS, then, we can see that there are contrast pairs, one 
of which is “friend”/”foe” and such things work asymmetrically with regard to 
predication. The former, if shot, is “killed” while the latter is “rolled in on”; the 
former carries “orange panels” and the latter may carry “orange rockets”, and so 
forth. Shooting the former, then, makes one a killer; the latter makes one a hero 
(or at least a dutiful member of the military). The somewhat oxymoronic phrase 
“friendly fire” is in the local-cultural vocabulary precisely to mark this 
asymmetry. And so, it’s no surprise that the term “kill” isn’t used of the strafing 
runs until after the “blue-on-blue” (“friendly fire”) situation has come to light and 
the mistake (as much that of ground intelligence as that of the pilots) is realised.xii Page 13 
Extract 9 
 
1347.01 P35:  go. 
1347.02 M34:  roger we are getting an initial ah brief that 
there w’s ah one killed and one wounded, over. 
1347.09 P35:  Popov three::: fi:::ve (*.*) copy. R T B 
((return to base)) 
1347.18 P35:  I’m going to be sick. 
1347.24 P36:  ah:::: fu::ck. 
1347.48 P35:  >did you hear?< 
1347.51 P36:  yeah, this sucks. 
1347.52 P35:  we’re in jail dude. 
1347.59 P36:  AH::::::. 
 
Membership categorisation analysis, then, tells us — via its central concepts and 
their relations — how societies generate social identities and how crucial it is that 
the “right type of person” be identified given the situational particulars. The 
category “friend” works symmetrically with its co-category to produce the pair 
“friend/friend”. One cannot just be a friend in isolation; another is required to 
avow the reciprocal descriptor. “Avowing the reciprocal descriptor”  — through 
such predicates as eating together, exchanging birthday cards or, indeed, observing 
orange panels — may sound like a slice of merely technical sociological language in 
its own right; but it can be, very literally, a matter of life and death. 
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Notes 
 
i A link to the video is deleted at the ellipsis. My interpolations are shown {{thus}}. 
ii It should be noted that, while the area has not been extensively researched, 
there is some evidence that it is not just persons-in-the-society that are organised 
in a “membershipping” way. One further instance may be buildings, places, 
geographical locations and the like (see McHoul & Watson, 1984). 
iii For an applied and legally/politically consequential use of Sacks’s analysis of 
the device FAMILY, see Summerfield & McHoul (2005). 
iv I use the term “moral” in the traditional sense of what were once called the 
moral sciences; studies of the “doctrine or practices of the duties of life” (as 
Chambers has it). By saying that category selections are “moral” I mean to say that 
they carry with them common senses of what any person-so-categorised “ought” 
to do. 
v See Watson (1978) and Wowk (1984) for perspicuous and socially-consequential 
examples. See Rapley et al (2003) for another case involving news reportage and 
killing. See Eglin & Hester (1999a, 1999b) for a similar case. 
vi Naturally, the other way of putting this would be to class “kill” (let alone 
“murder”) as a dysphemism. 
vii As best as I can tell, the reference is right. However I am unable to find the 
original and cannot be re-quoted on this with any veracity. 
viii My citations from the transcript are not exactly as published in The Sun (and 
later in other newspapers). Maurice Nevile (University of Canberra) has kindly 
lent his expertise in air-to-ground communications by working from the video 
footage to provide a transcript closer to the usual conversation-analytic 
conventions. See Appendix 1 (below) for a brief summary and Schegloff (2007: 
265-269) for a complete description. In later extracts, there is a fourth speaker, 
Manila34 (M34), also a ground controller. 
ix The term “connote” here is weak. The literature on connotation is legion and a 
great deal of it, especially in literary studies, takes connotation to be emotional, 
associative, figurative and variable from individual to individual. Even the more 
formal semiotic conception of connotation — where first-level signs are used as 
signifiers at a second level to generate further meanings (Barthes, 1967: 89-94) — 
by no means evades such psychologism. For a snapshot, see the range of 
definitions at: 
http://www.google.com.au/search?hl=en&q=define%3Aconnotation&btn
G=Search&meta= 
One promise of MCA for the sociology of identity formation is a displacement of 
any such version of connotation by a semi-formal, yet situationally responsive, 
socio-logic of implication and inference. For such an argument drawing on Sacks 
and Wittgenstein inter alia, see McHoul & Rapley (2003). 
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x My thanks here to the editorial referee for Social Identities who put the matter 
succinctly: “the velocity eliminates the space for ‘friendlies’ to be a viable 
identity within the killing zone”. 
xi This was the single most broadcast line from the tape on TV news bulletins on 
and around 7th February. On radio, at least one talkback caller condemned P35 
not so much for his actions as for thinking, having taken a life, only of his own 
skin. The various other comments (“I’m going to be sick” and several expletives 
that have definite tones of deep regret) did not make it to air; but see Extract 9, 
below. 
xii In a quite different context, at 1340.35, P36 says: “I think killing these damn 
rocket launchers would be great”. Again, note the reference to matériel, not 
persons, as the object of “killing”. 
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Appendix 1: transcription symbols 
 
(0.5)  Pause in seconds and 10ths second 
(.)  Micropause, under (0.2) 
(*.*)  Untimed pause 
(    )  Transcriber doubt, inaudible 
(word)  Transcriber doubt, but likely hearing 
((word))  Transcriber comment 
(word)/(world)  Alternative hearings 
wor::d  Sound extended/prolonged 
word  Emphasis 
WORD  Increased emphasis 
=  Latching, next word follows immediately 
>words<  Compressed/rushed talk 
<words>  Slowed/drawn out talk 
˚word˚  Spoken quietly 
word?  Intonation rise 
word¿  Slight intonation rise 
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Appendix 2: The Sun’s diagram 
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QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
 